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A B S T R A C T
The Port of Rotterdam is an important industrial cluster, comprising mainly oil refining, chemical
production and power generation. In 2016, the port’s industry accounted for 19% of the
Netherlands’ total CO2 emissions. The Port of Rotterdam Authority is aware that the cluster is
heavily exposed to future decarbonisation policies, as most of its activities focus on trading,
handling, converting and using fossil fuels. Based on a study for the Port Authority using a
mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods, our article explores three pathways whereby the
port’s industry can maintain its strong position while significantly reducing its CO2 emissions and
related risks by 2050. The pathways differ in terms of the EU’s assumed climate change miti-
gation ambitions and the key technological choices made by the cluster’s companies. The focus of
the paper is on identifying key risks associated with each scenario and ways in which these could
be mitigated.
1. Introduction
The Paris Agreement, adopted in December 2015 by 195 countries, aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate
change by “[h]olding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing
efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels” (UNFCCC, 2015). The agreement, which entered into
force in November 2016, intends to achieve this through “a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by
sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century”. The agreement requires countries to intensify their respective strategies
and policies towards this aim.
Modelling studies (Akimoto et al., 2017; Rogelj et al., 2015) suggest that limiting warming to well below 2 °C will require a rapid
reduction in global energy-related GHG emissions over the coming decades, with levels close to zero by the middle of the century.
This will require a massive transformation of all sectors of the economy. For the industrial sector, the transformational challenges
could be extensive given the variety of different technologies and production processes used and its generally long reinvestment
periods. The sector’s competitive nature makes it particularly difficult for early adopters to accept – even temporarily – higher costs
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associated with new technologies.1 Consequently, we believe there is an urgent and significant need to develop scenarios or path-
ways2 for the long-term decarbonisation of industrial sectors and industrial clusters. Such pathways can provide crucial support to
policymakers and investors, helping them to make informed decisions about immediate and appropriate measures and actions to take
to result in a sufficient level of decarbonisation in the decades to come.
In recent years, there have been an increasing number of scenario studies on the potential to deeply decarbonise entire economies
(e.g. IEA, 2017; Greenpeace et al., 2015), or individual industrial sectors such as the chemical sector (Dechema, 2017). However, to
our knowledge, no long-term, deep-decarbonisation scenarios for a specific industrial region or cluster have previously been de-
veloped. We believe that such regional scenarios are important for complementing the more general studies, as they can better reflect
the specific technologies, market environments and mitigation potentials at a certain location, taking into account their specific
interlinkages and infrastructures. In this way, the regional approach can increase the relevance of a decarbonisation study for
regional policymakers, investors and other stakeholders. Furthermore, regional scenario studies may also help to identify and address
region-specific risks associated with decarbonisation pathways, especially if they adequately involve stakeholders in the process of
scenario development (Schneider et al., 2014; Lechtenböhmer, 2017; Espert et al., 2016). Ideally, such studies involving stakeholders
can improve decision-making processes and foster acceptance for transformational pathways among the public, as well as helping
companies to anticipate and pro-actively embrace potential radical future market and regulatory changes if participation is "un-
derpinned by a philosophy that emphasises empowerment, equity, trust and learning" (Reed, 2008).3
This article identifies options for the deep decarbonisation of energy-intensive industries in the EU and beyond by describing
possible future pathways for a major European petrochemical cluster, namely the industrial cluster of the Port of Rotterdam. The
port’s industrial cluster comprises, to a great extent, companies operating in the energy-intensive sectors of oil refining, chemical
manufacture and power and steam generation. The five refineries in the port constitute 87% of the Dutch and 8% of the total EU
capacity. Steam cracking, as the most relevant initial process in the value chain of petrochemicals manufacturing, is represented in
the port’s cluster with one third of the Dutch and 4% of the total EU steam cracking capacity, while the two newly built coal-fired
power stations amount to half of the Dutch capacity of coal-fired electricity generation.4
In 2016, the cluster’s CO2 emissions5 totalled approximately 31Mt (Port of Rotterdam Authority, 2017a) and accounted for 19%
of the Netherlands’ total CO2 emissions (Statistics Netherlands, 2018). The cluster’s CO2 emissions grew by 48% between 1990 and
2016, mainly because the energy sector’s CO2 emissions in the port area more than doubled between 1990 and 2016 (Port of
Rotterdam Authority, 2017a; DCMR, 2008, personal communication with DCMR in September 2016). Emissions from the chemical
sector and from crude oil refining also increased slightly as economic output grew over the years, offsetting the emission-reducing
effects of higher energy efficiency.6 Looking only at the more recent years, there is evidence of a significant increase in the cluster’s
CO2 emissions (by 24%) between 2013 and 2016. This growth can mostly be accounted for by the two new coal-fired power stations
owned by Engie (previously GDF Suez) and E.ON becoming operational during this period.
The Port of Rotterdam Authority is aware that future global and EU decarbonisation policies will affect the port’s industrial
cluster, as most of its economic activities focus on trading, handling, converting and using fossil fuels. This makes the port’s busi-
nesses particularly vulnerable to global and European decarbonisation efforts. Against this background, and in light of the Paris
Agreement targets, the Port Authority decided to take a proactive role towards transforming the port area (Bosman et al., 2018) and
in early 2016 commissioned the Wuppertal Institute to conduct a study (Samadi et al., 2016) on Decarbonisation Pathways for the
Industrial Cluster of the Port of Rotterdam.7 The aim of the study was to explore the potential challenges and opportunities arising for
the port’s industrial cluster from European decarbonisation efforts, both in terms of future demand for the companies’ products and
changes towards less carbon-intensive production processes. To this end, the study identified scenarios up to 2050 illustrating how
the port could prepare for such a future and how it could take pro-active action towards deep decarbonisation. The study involved
stakeholders who took part in a technology review as well as in a discussion of key mitigations strategies and scenario narratives. Due
to the nature of a scoping study, only preliminary scenario results were discussed with stakeholders. However, the scenarios were
1 Due to their high CO2 emissions, a transformation of the energy-intensive processing industries is particularly important for global climate
change mitigation efforts. For a characterisation of energy-intensive processing industries and a discussion of their decarbonisation potential, see
Wesseling et al. (2017) and Bataille et al. (2018).
2 The terms “scenarios” and “pathways” both describe concrete trajectories from today’s situation of a nation, a region or a sector to a possible or
desired future. In this sense, both terms are used partly synonymously in this paper. However, when we talk about scenarios, we typically percieve a
coherent set of future developments on all relevant levels from global via European or Dutch to local and industry level at the Port of Rotterdam.
When we use the term pathways, we refer to the concrete investment and business trajectories of our focus area, the industrial cluster at the Port of
Rotterdam, within the respective broader scenario.
3 At the same time, potential pitfalls of involving stakeholders need to be considered (Mielke et al., 2016). Specifically, scientists need to be aware
that each stakeholder has a unique interest, making it important to check the legitimacy of stakeholders’ claims and to ensure that the scientific
approach is not captured by stakeholders.
4 All shares mentioned were derived by a data analysis of the Wuppertal Institute’s database on industry production stock in Europe and represent
the status as of May 2019. See more information on the database and the associated WISEE model below.
5 Non-CO2 greenhouse gases make up only about 1% of Rotterdam’s total GHG emissions (personal communication with DCMR via email in June
2016) and have, therefore, not been taken into account in this analysis.
6 One reason for increased emissions from the refinery sector was the introduction of stricter regulations on transport fuel emissions, requiring
higher energy use and thus CO2 emissions in refining to reduce the fuels’ SO2 levels.
7 The study can be downloaded at https://www.portofrotterdam.com/nl/file/18544/download?token=4Ri58reM.
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used by the Port Authority as an input into discussions at Dutch national level about measures and strategies for achieving GHG
mitigation. As part of this process, stakeholders were given further opportunities to put forward and discuss their own visions for the
future of the port’s industrial cluster (Werkgroep Industriecluster Rotterdam-Moerdijk, 2018).
This article introduces the four scenarios from the study (Samadi et al., 2016) and then focuses on identifying and discussing the
risks associated with each of the scenarios.
Section 2 explains the mixed-methods approach of the study and the modelling framework used to derive the quantitative sce-
narios. Section 3 then describes and compares the four scenarios. Subsequently, Section 4 identifies key risks as well as opportunities
associated with each scenario and discusses how the main risks associated with the deep decarbonisation scenarios could potentially
be mitigated. Finally, Section 5 concludes and derives key insights from the study.
2. Approach and modelling framework
The scope of the study’s energy and GHG modelling covers the direct CO2 emissions occurring within the territory of the
Rotterdam port area, including the industrial site of Moerdijk, south of Rotterdam. Emissions caused either by the extraction of
resources processed at the port, or by the use of the port’s products, are also part of the GHG emissions from the port’s value chain –
but are not quantified here. This approach is justified as the main aim of the study is not to derive a quantitative GHG target for the
port, but to sketch viable future industry clusters that might emerge at the port under different socio-political and regulatory en-
vironments in the overall context of deep decarbonisation.
The port area forms a complex cluster with many interlinkages and value chains. For this analysis, however, the sectoral system
boundary of the analysis was restricted to electricity generation, waste incineration and the petrochemical cluster within the analysed
area, as the bulk of the GHG emissions can be attributed to these GHG and energy-intensive resource and product flows.
2.1. System analysis
Before developing the scenarios, the port’s energy system was analysed in detail. As there are no energy statistics available
specifically for the port area, the energy system was modelled for the base year (2015). Relevant combustion plants and their
capacities were identified based on the port’s “Facts & Figures” brochure (Port of Rotterdam Authority, 2016) and crosschecked with
databases on electricity generation units and heavy industry stocks from the WISEE model (see below).
The following capacities were taken into account:
• Electricity generation units (in MWel; 70 units)
• Refinery processes (in t/a; 32 units)
• Several important petrochemical processes (in t/a; 53 units)
The specific energy and resource demand of the processes analysed was derived from the literature and the results were validated
with data from the European Union Transaction Log (EUTL) of the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), which
provides site or plant-specific data on annual CO2 emissions in the form of time series.
Refinery use was modelled using an optimisation procedure. The different kinds of processes were modelled for all five Rotterdam
refineries, as well as for the only other refinery in the Netherlands, the Vlissingen refinery. The results for all six Dutch refineries were
validated with the available aggregated data for all refineries from the Dutch energy balance.
The steam supply of the different sites along the harbour was modelled taking existing CHP capacities into account. Steam outputs
and inputs of processes were balanced using a simplified approach, ignoring different steam pressure levels or discontinuities of steam
supply via excess heat and steam demand.
2.2. Scenario analysis
A number of different methods – both qualitative and quantitative – were used to develop the scenarios. The steps are outlined in
Fig. 1 and can be summarised as follows:
• Meta analysis of European energy scenarios
• Technology review based on literature and interviews
• Development of plausible qualitative scenario narratives of “viable clusters”
• Translation of scenario narratives into reinvestment/new investment pathways regarding power and heat generation and in-
dustrial plants, resulting in future production capacities (stock)
• Quantitative energy system simulation including scenario validation, modelling stock utilisation, energy demand, CO2 emissions
and product flows
• Discussion of initial scenario versions with stakeholders and subsequent refinement of scenarios and their narratives
The scenarios are designed to analyse the range of opportunities for the port’s industrial cluster under different environments.
Although the Port of Rotterdam Authority is an important national stakeholder and is involved in the Dutch debate on dec-
arbonisation targets and strategies, from the perspective of the port’s stakeholders European climate and energy policy can be
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regarded as a largely exogenous variable. Therefore, it is reasonable to rely on EU scenarios as an overarching framework and to
explore the different opportunities for the port under three different climate mitigation regimes:
• no additional mitigation measures;
• mitigation measures in line with the EU’s 80% reduction target for 2050; and
• mitigation measures in line with the EU’s 95% reduction target for 2050.
This is a methodology commonly used in strategic corporate planning (Burmeister et al., 2004).
Based on the system analysis for the base year (see above), the study’s scenarios were built by combining a backcasting and a
forecasting approach. The starting point for defining industrial clusters in the port area for the year 2050 (see Fig. 1) were European energy
and emissions scenarios (EC, 2011; IEA, 2015a; Greenpeace et al., 2015). The European scenarios provide time series on the volume and
structure of transport fuel demand, the pathway of investment in renewable electricity generation capacities (such as onshore and offshore
wind, PV, geothermal energy etc.), the primary energy use and the sectoral CO2 emissions. The EU scenario results were broken down into
the markets that are relevant for the cluster’s businesses, especially the North-Western European transport fuel market.
Based on three different climate regimes and thus three different business environments derived from the available European
energy scenarios, four plausible economic visions for the industrial cluster were developed as scenario narratives. These four energy
and CO2 emission scenarios for the port’s industrial cluster are referred to as “technology scenarios” in Fig. 1. They were developed
and quantitatively modelled and include one business-as-usual scenario as well as three CO2 emission mitigation scenarios – one for
the 80% reduction environment and two for the 95% reduction environment
A technology review showing GHG mitigation potentials and market-readiness of various industrial technologies was carried out
on the basis of the available literature, particularly using industry branch roadmap studies carried out at national (UK) and EU
levels.8 The resulting technology matrix summarises information on technology-readiness, acceptance, economics, use potential,
synergies with certain GHG mitigation strategies, energy efficiency and GHG emissions. It draws upon proven technologies in order to
foster stakeholder buy-in, as scenarios built on such technologies could be considered easier to achieve (Giurco et al., 2011) and more
realistic. However, it became apparent the technology portfolios identified in the roadmap studies were insufficient for achieving far-
reaching reductions in GHG emissions. Consequently, they were tailored to the existing production stock at the port and an additional
strong electrification strategy was assumed for achieving greater reductions in GHG emissions (see e.g. Lechtenböhmer et al., 2016).
The existing roadmap studies did not incorporate such a strong electrification strategy. The technology assessment was commented
on and amended by several stakeholders through a survey sent by email in May 2016.9 Consequently, the selection of technologies in
Fig. 1. Schematic diagram of the model used to develop the scenarios.
8 See WSP et al. (2015) for a summary on the UK roadmaps. At European level, branch roadmaps have been developed by industry itself, e.g. by
Cefic (2013) for the chemical sector.
9 Key stakeholders were identified and provided by the Port Authority. 34% of the stakeholders contacted (corresponding to 11 companies or
associations) filled out and returned the questionnaire. The response rate was much higher for industrial stakeholders (10 out of 19 companies or
associations responded) than for societal stakeholders (only 1 out of 13 organisations responded).
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the study’s scenarios was informed inter alia by the port’s stakeholders.
The clusters identified were tested in relation to technical feasibility, energy demand and emissions reduction using a backcasting
approach and the Wuppertal Institute’s WISEE energy and emissions system model.10
Following the energy system model classification of Herbst et al. (2012), the WISEE model can be classified as a bottom-up
simulation model with a very detailed representation of energy system technologies and a low degree of endogenisation. Conse-
quently, many parameters can be changed by incorporating stakeholders’ knowledge, e.g. via assessments of future market shares of
certain technologies. The focus of such models is on unveiling existing energy efficiency and GHG mitigation potentials, rather than
on finding the cost-optimal pathway for achieving a given target (see Hourcade et al., 2006). Lund et al. (2017) argue that simulation
models leave more room for “political decisions” than optimisation models. In the case of our scenarios for the Port of Rotterdam
industrial cluster, the target function is multi-dimensional and various non-quantifiable perspectives from the different stakeholders
were taken into account. The simulation approach is well-suited in this type of case as it allows for consideration of such issues (Lund
et al., 2017). The risks and uncertainties related to a selection of key issues such as public acceptance or infrastructure development
are discussed below.
The WISEE model was used to test the viability of the clusters by calculating their respective net energy demand and their
respective CO2 emissions. Based on the model results it was assessed whether energy demand and CO2 emissions of the port’s cluster
appear to be compatible with the overall energy supply and CO2 reduction pathways as described by the corresponding European
energy and emissions scenarios.
As a next step, concrete investment pathways for creating the future clusters were defined, taking into account the lifetime of
existing stock, future demand for transport fuels as well as other products and investment cycles. The analysis focused on the question
of how to bring necessary reinvestment in line with the pathways to future viable clusters.
For the intermediate scenario years 2020, 2030 and 2040, energy demand, resource demand and CO2 emissions were calculated
in the model, testing compatibility with the overall system as described in the European energy scenarios with regard to energy use
and CO2 emissions. The pathways were subsequently analysed to detect challenges in regard to the availability of technologies and
the investments needed and to define decision windows. Representations of 2050 clusters were rejected if a plausible pathway could
not be found.
The four preliminary scenarios and their narratives were discussed in two workshops in June 2016, one with industry stake-
holders and another with representatives of civil society. The workshop with industry stakeholders included representatives of key
industrial players at the port, such as ENGIE, Huntsman, Shell, Air Liquide, while the workshop with societal stakeholders consisted
of representatives from environmental groups such as NMZH and relevant authorities, for example from the City of Rotterdam.11 The
general role of crucial strategies like biomass, CCS, energy efficiency and electrification were critically reviewed during these
workshops and the insights gained from the workshops resulted in modified scenario narratives, refined investment pathways and the
consideration of an additional scenario variant, as discussed in the next section.12 The final scenarios were completed in September
2016.
3. Description and comparison of scenarios
This section briefly describes and compares the “Business-as-usual” (BAU) scenario and the three decarbonisation scenarios in
terms of their reinvestment/new investment in production stock and their energy use and GHG emissions.
3.1. Brief description of the four developed scenarios
The general assumption made about the future clusters in all scenarios is that they will still participate significantly in the markets
they supply today, i.e. the markets for fuels and petrochemicals. Whereas fuel supply is assumed to be substantially lower in line with
projections for the EU, the production of chemicals is assumed to be stable – which is a simplified assumption reflecting significant
differences in current projections of future demand in and trade of chemical products (IEA, 2013; Cefic, 2013; Dechema, 2017).
Generating and selling electricity is also an important business in today’s industrial cluster. We analysed how generation capa-
cities within the port might evolve under different climate regimes for various types of power plants. In all three European framework
scenarios used, the electricity generation mix in 2050 differs substantially from today’s mix.
The “Business-as-usual” (BAU) scenario follows a business-as-usual path for the EU (EC, 2011), which envisages little further
decarbonisation in the industry, refinery, power plant and transport sectors. Under such circumstances, the port region might be able
10 See Fig. 1 and Schneider et al. (2014) for more information on the model.
11 The discussions held at the two workshops are summarized in the annex of Samadi et al. (2016).
12 Specifically, the strongly deviating views among stakeholders regarding the future viability of a strong reliance on biomass and CCS – with
industry stakeholders mostly optimistic and societal stakeholders mostly pessimistic – led to the decision to differentiate the two deep dec-
arbonisation scenarios more strongly compared to their original form. One of the two scenarios now relies heavily on biomass and CCS, while the
other one now focuses on closing carbon cycles, enabling the scenario to use much less biomass and to refrain from the use of CCS. In addition,
several stakeholders pointed towards the ongoing discussions in the Netherlands of phasing out coal electricity generation early in order for the
country to meet its existing 2020 and proposed 2030 GHG reduction targets. To reflect the possibility of an early exit of coal power generation, a
scenario variant was added to one of the deep decarbonisation scenarios in which the two relatively new coal power plants in Rotterdam are
assumed to be closed by 2019 and 2025 respectively.
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to maintain its current business model of producing fuels and chemicals synergistically based on crude oil and could continue
operating the fossil-fired power plants. The refinery sector, however, would already shrink in the BAU scenario, mainly due to
efficiency improvements in the transport sector and existing overcapacities in the North-Western European markets.
The “Technical Progress”(TP) scenario follows a scenario developed by the IEA (2015a) as a global 2 °C Scenario, in which by
2050 the EU achieves a reduction in energy and process-related CO2 emissions of roughly 80% compared to 1990. A reduction of 80%
still permits a certain level of emissions, which in the IEA’s energy scenario is assumed to allow for fossil fuel use especially in some
difficult-to-decarbonise modes of transport, in heat production and for some non-captured CO2 in the carbon capture process at coal
and gas-fired power plants. In the TP scenario, the port must adapt its “oil and coal-based business model”. Refinery output shrinks
considerably, but the refineries are still suppliers of transport fuels and petrochemical feedstock. The big coal and gas-fired power
stations, as well as carbon-intensive refinery processes like FCC and hydrogen production from steam reforming, are equipped with
carbon capture and connected to an offshore CO2 pipeline.
The “Biomass and CCS”(BIO) scenario assumes – as does the CYC scenario (below) – that the EU aims for a more ambitious 90%
to 95% reduction in GHG emissions by 2050 relative to 1990 and that respective policies will be enacted.
The BIO scenario assumes that large amounts of biomass can be supplied sustainably. In total, 140 PJ or 9 million tons of dry
biomass are needed annually by 2050 as feedstock and would have to be imported from abroad via vessels. This compares to 4 million
tons of coal and 50 million tons of oil, which were calculated to be the cluster’s annual demand in the base year 2015.
The conversion of the industrial cluster along the lines of the BIO scenario requires significant additional investment: CO2 pi-
pelines connect different sources within the port area, among them processes with relatively pure CO2 streams such as steam re-
formers producing hydrogen from natural gas or oil residue gasification plants. These sources can be regarded as "low hanging fruits"
for carbon capture.
Other infrastructure either requires reinvestment, such as heat and cogeneration plants due to end of lifetime of existing tech-
nology, or new investment, such as the hydrogen and probably the electricity grid. The petrochemical cluster remains unchanged but
needs reinvestment in the core basic process of steam cracking.
The "Closed Carbon Cycle" (CYC) scenario, on the other hand, assumes that the port’s petrochemical cluster will use waste as a
feedstock in the future instead of fossil resources. This means that carbon required for the olefins and aromatics will stem from waste.
The port could make use of its recent role as a hub for plastic waste and strengthen it by creating an additional value chain, as
opposed to only shipping the plastic waste.
Chemical recycling of the waste at the port via gasification to carbon monoxide and hydrogen, as well as the subsequent step of
methanol production, implies energy losses resulting in the need for considerable amounts of renewables-based electricity by the
middle of the century. In the CYC scenario this electricity cannot be sourced from within the port area. Electricity will be used at the
port to supply heat as well as hydrogen for the synthetic generation of feedstock for the chemical industry (see Figure 4). Tech-
nologies and investments particularly required in this scenario are in the area of water electrolysis and gasification or pyrolysis to
capture carbon from waste, as well as technologies for the production of base chemicals from syngas. In this scenario there is no
technological need to adapt the downstream value chains with their existing assets of processing olefins to polymers. The petro-
chemical cluster thus remains integrated.
For the fuel supply chain, however, it is assumed in the CYC scenario that only the most downstream parts of the value chains will
remain at the port by the middle of the century. Hydrocrackers will process imported bio-based intermediates to deliver the relatively
small volume of hydrocarbon liquid fuels still used in the transport sector, particularly bio-based kerosene for aviation.
A variant of this scenario, the Early-Coal-Exit scenario (CYC-ECE) describes the development if the coal-fired power stations at the
port are closed earlier, i.e. in 2019 and 2025 respectively. This possibility reflects current political discussions in the Netherlands on
how to achieve national GHG emission reductions targets for the years 2020 and 2030.
3.2. Comparison of the scenarios
Fig. 2 briefly describes the results of the model-based backcasting and forecasting scenario development, showing the timescales
for making key investments in the respective scenarios.
The figure indicates that the TP and BIO scenarios require fast adoption of a first CCS pilot plant to keep the two new coal-fired
units in operation in accordance with short to medium-term GHG mitigation targets. If the fuel markets change only marginally, as
assumed in the BAU and TP scenarios, where electric mobility is assumed to require more time to be widely adopted, refinery
reinvestment would be due during the 2020s in order to maintain the port’s market share in the European fuel market. Reinvestment
into the Moerdijk steam cracker commissioned in the 1970s is crucial in the BAU, TP and BIO scenarios. This would enable the cluster
to continue processing oil products to platform chemicals.13 According to the authors’ estimates, which are based on the date of
commission and on typical lifetimes given in the literature, reinvestment into the steam cracker would need to be made around the
year 2030. The steam cracker reinvestment itself would not necessarily lead to the cluster being locked into a fossil oil-based route:
imported or domestically-produced and biomass-derived Fischer-Tropsch products could also be processed in the future instead of
fossil oil, if the design of the cracker allows for this kind of flexibility – which is standard in current cracker technology. Even the use
13 Materials derived from crude oil will typically end up as fossil CO2 emissions from waste incineration after the end of the use phase of the
materials if carbon is not recycled in a gasification or pyrolysis process or the remaining CO2 is not geologically stored when incinerating the waste.
Incinerating the amounts of ethylene and propylene produced annually in Rotterdam would result in CO2 emissions of around 7 Mt/a.
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of plastic waste as a feedstock for petrochemicals as foreseen in the CYC scenario could be combined with a flexible steam cracker if
the plastic waste was liquefied priorly in a pyrolysis process. However, reinvestment into one of the oil refineries, which coincides
with steam cracking reinvestment (including CCS) in the TP and BIO scenarios would eventually lead to an oil lock-in of the cluster in
these scenarios – so a later change of the pathway towards an alternative feedstock, as is assumed in the CYC case, would become
difficult.
Radical decarbonisation of the transport sector, as assumed in the BIO and CYC scenarios, assumes a shift to battery or hydrogen-
driven fuel cell vehicles and electric long-haul trucks using overhead lines on main motorways. Shipping, aviation and other heavy
road transport fuel is provided by synthetic fuels based on renewable hydrogen and non-fossil carbon (Greenpeace et al., 2015). We
assume that these will be imported methanol for shipping and Fischer-Tropsch kerosene and diesel. European and specifically
Rotterdam’s refinery capacities would need to be adjusted respectively.
For GHG mitigation in thermal power plants and for some other processes in refineries and petrochemicals production, a scale-up
of CCS will be necessary in the 2030s in the BIO and TP scenarios – based upon learning from the CCS pilot plant assumed to be
implemented in the 2020s in these scenarios. The assumption is made that the CO2 captured will be transported via pipeline to an
offshore deposit in the North Sea and stored there in a former natural gas field with a capacity of 8Mt. There are other possible
deposits in close proximity to this field with a combined storage capacity of around 100Mt (TNO, 2011). However, the total amount
of CO2 to be captured and stored in the BIO scenario over the full period of CCS application between 2022 and 2050 would be 158Mt.
In the TP scenario, as much as 250Mt would be required. Consequently, the CO2 storage infrastructure would need to be extended.
An extension of the CO2 grid to the northern part of the Netherlands could make further large storage sites accessible and would also
allow for the inclusion of more CO2 sources beyond the Rotterdam industrial cluster, e.g. from the Dutch or western German steel
industry.
During the 2030s, the respective investment pathways for the TP and BIO scenarios diverge. In the TP scenario, sustained demand
for fossil fuels induces refinery reinvestments as in the BAU scenario, whereas in the BIO scenario fuel supply is switched to Fischer-
Tropsch (FT) based synfuels derived from biomass and hydrogen. In the BIO scenario, a significant retrofit of the thermal power
stations is required after 2040, as all the stations need to be converted to allow for waste and biomass-firing and to connect them to
the heat grid to supply high-temperature heat for the cluster. In this context, it is assumed that an extensive heat grid with heat
storage will be developed to optimise the supply of heat for the industrial cluster.
The CYC scenario differs significantly from the other scenarios. It does not assume reinvestment in the refineries or steam
crackers, nor the retrofitting of power plants. The main reason for this is the fundamental restructuring of hydrocarbon supply, which
is switched between 2030 and 2040 from mineral oil-based to renewable feedstock-based technology and secondary materials such as
plastic and other waste, requiring investment into methanol to olefins technology (MTO). Almost in parallel, massive investment in
electrolysers will be needed to supply renewables-based hydrogen to methanol synthesis, feeding the MTO process. A complementing
heat network would need to be installed, connecting geothermal sources as well as the industrial heat sources and sinks.14
The BIO and CYC scenarios show two possible ways for the port to adapt to potential future external pressure demanding quick
and deep decarbonisation. Both scenarios describe rather prototypical pathways. A more likely deep decarbonisation pathway will
consist of a combination of these two scenarios. Some of the strategies could be used in both scenarios, reducing the risk of relying on
Fig. 2. Key reinvestment/new investment to be made in the four scenarios over time.
Source: Own figure
14 Due to the huge spatial extension of the entire industrial area, heat transmission could be based on hot water instead of steam. The required
energy delta to supply steam in different conditions could then be delivered by decentralised power-to-heat stations and compressors.
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only one feedstock or technology. However, pursuing certain strategies will limit the potential to use alternative strategies. One
example is plastic waste, which in the BIO scenario is used to fire power plants connected to CCS, whereas in the CYC scenario it is
used as a feedstock. On the other hand, the biomass-to-fuel route of the BIO scenario could be combined with the CYC circular
strategy for petrochemicals, although this would further increase the technological complexity and lead to higher hydrogen demand
at the cluster.
Fig. 3 shows cumulative CO2 emissions in the different scenarios over the period 2016–2050. Cumulative emissions are a better
indicator of the actual climate burden of a scenario than the emissions of a certain year. As modelling covers only the base year 2015
and the four scenario years 2020, 2030, 2040 and 2050, CO2 emissions for the intermediate years were generally derived by linear
interpolation. However, the introduction of CCS was taken into account in a more precise way, by considering the actual years of
connection of the CCS plants to the existing power plants. These are 2022 and 2029 in both the TP and BIO scenarios
The BAU scenario – which results in only slight reductions in annual CO2 emissions – shows an almost linear development of
cumulative emissions. In this scenario, the mark of 400Mt, which roughly represents the total CO2 budget of the two most ambitious
scenarios (BIO and CYC-ECE), is fully used as early as 2030. The TP scenario shows considerable reductions in the medium term, as
indicated by a flattening of its emissions curve in Fig. 3. However, it fails to approach zero additional emissions even in the long term.
The BIO scenario leads to the lowest total amount of CO2 emissions over the scenario period, with emissions almost levelling off after
2040, meaning that very little CO2 will be emitted after 2050. However, the net CO2 emissions of 420Mt can only be reached through
the successful adoption of CCS and full conversion of the largest power plants to biomass, resulting in net negative emissions of
biomass-firing in the overall balance.15 The development of cumulative emissions in the CYC scenario demonstrates that a long-term
saturation of CO2 emissions is also possible without the use of CCS. In this case, however, the assumed continued unabated operation
of the two new coal-fired power stations until 2035 results in higher cumulative emissions compared to the BIO scenario, in which
deeper emission reductions are achieved early on. This is not inevitable, of course, as the CYC-ECE scenario variant shows. With an
earlier exit from coal-fired power generation, total cumulative emissions in this scenario variant are similar to the BIO case. Both
scenarios show that it would be possible to limit the total future CO2 emissions of the Port of Rotterdam industrial cluster to around
420Mt to 430Mt.
Finally, Fig. 4 shows the effects of decarbonisation on the electricity balance of the port. Whereas a considerable net surplus is
delivered to the electricity grid today, the strategy of electrification reverses the situation in the future in the two deep dec-
arbonisation scenarios BIO and CYC, making the port a net consumer of electricity in the long term. The external electricity demand
in the two deep decarbonisation scenarios is very high, especially in the CYC scenario. The bulk of electricity needed in this scenario
is used for water electrolysis, supplying the hydrogen needed for methanol synthesis.
Even in the CYC scenario, the electricity demand is still well below the estimated potential for renewable electricity generation in
the Netherlands as a whole by 2050 (Greenpeace/EREC 2013). In the CYC scenario, the port area is the most important provider of
hydrocarbon products in the country and can, therefore, claim a significant part of this potential. Furthermore, it should be noted that
some of the electricity demand in the CYC scenario in 2050, such as electrolysis and electric steam generation, could be managed in a
way to maximise its temporal flexibility. In this way, the port’s industrial cluster could contribute to optimising the use of fluctuating
electricity generation from wind and solar PV, stabilising the Dutch and European electricity grid.
Fig. 3. Cumulative CO2 emissions of the industrial and energy cluster at the port in the four scenarios (and one scenario variant) and geological CO2
storage in the scenarios.
Source: Own graph
15 It should also be stressed that biomass is assumed here to be CO2-neutral – a common approach in scenario studies. This is, however, typically
not the case for most types of biomass (Welfle et al., 2017), meaning that the GHG emissions in this scenario would actually be higher if biomass life-
cycle emissions were taken into account.
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4. Discussion of key risks and opportunities associated with each scenario
In this section we identify and discuss key risks and opportunities associated with each of the four alternative technology and
investment pathways for the Port of Rotterdam’s industrial cluster presented above. As suggested by Lieu et al. (2019, this issue), two
categories of risks can be differentiated. Implementation risks are potential barriers to realising the developments described in each
scenario, while consequential risks are unintended negative outcomes of the scenarios. Subsection 4.1 identifies the implementation
risks and consequential risks and discusses which ones could be relevant to what extent for each of the four scenarios. Subsection 4.2
then identifies and discusses relevant opportunities associated with each scenario. Finally, subsection 4.3 focuses on the deep dec-
arbonisation scenario CYC and briefly discusses how the most relevant risks could be mitigated and which kinds of stakeholders could
play a role in their mitigation.
4.1. Identification and discussion of risks associated with pursuing the scenarios
The key risks identified in relation to the scenarios are listed in Table 1. The table provides an assessment of how relevant each
risk is for the four main scenarios developed. A double X (XX) means that a particular risk is of high relevance for a scenario, a single
X means there is a medium risk and a blank space means that a particular risk is deemed to be low or irrelevant.
As the table shows, we assess implementation risks to be more numerous than consequential risks for all the developed scenarios.
This is because (as explained above) each pathway for the industrial cluster of the Port of Rotterdam relies heavily on specific global
and European framework conditions. During the implementation phase of the pathways, there will inevitably be uncertainties re-
garding the future development of these conditions. For example, if a BAU development is pursued by the cluster, an unforeseen
tightening of European climate policies would pose a major threat to the economic viability of such a pathway. Similarly, pursuing
either the BIO or the CYC pathway, perhaps in response to early signs of highly ambitious EU climate mitigation targets, carries
considerable economic risk should these targets decrease. The implementation risks, therefore, mirror the uncertainty regarding
future EU and global climate mitigation ambition and policy. On the other hand, consequential risks, by definition, only occur if
scenarios are realised. This will only happen if there is a sufficient match between global and EU framework developments and
Fig. 4. Electricity balance of the port area.
Source: Own graph
Table 1
Implementation and consequential risks identified for the four scenarios developed.
Risks BAU TP BIO CYC
Implementation risks
Anticipated technological developments fail to be realised X XX XX
Insufficient incentives for investment in new technologies X XX XX
Delay in, or lack of, infrastructure investment XX XX X
Opposition from status-quo interests X X XX
Lack of public acceptance for the use of new technologies X XX XX X
Lack of public acceptance for the use of existing technologies XX X X X
Lack of sufficient access to, or excessive future prices of:
biomass X XX X
electricity X XX
hydrogen and/or synthetic fuels X
CO2 emissions allowances XX X
Consequential risks
Economic structure might not remain sustainable post-2050 XX X X
Industrial activities could be affected by climate change impacts XX XX X X
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corresponding investment decisions by the cluster. Therefore, in terms of consequential risks, any risks associated with a mismatch
between framework conditions and the cluster’s actions are not relevant – with the result that we only envisage a few consequential
risks. However, it should be stressed that it cannot be ruled out that we simply lack the imaginative power to foresee additional
potential consequential risks.
In the following, each identified risk and its scenario-specific assessments (as shown in Table 1) will be briefly explained.
4.1.1. Discussion of implementation risks
Anticipated technological developments fail to be realised
Deep decarbonisation in the more ambitious scenarios depends to some extent on technologies yet to be scaled up, with typically
low technological readiness levels at demonstration plant or even at pilot plant status. Although assumptions regarding future
technological progress appear to be quite conservative in the scenarios as no highly speculative new technologies were assumed to be
deployed, there is nonetheless some risk that technological developments will be slower than assumed in the scenarios or even not
successful at all. Development of nuclear fusion technology is an example of a very long and as yet unsuccessful development period
(Cohn, 1997).
The main technological development risk in the scenarios consists of the combination of technologies, such as water electrolysis,
carbon capture at different plant types, MtO and waste gasification and geological CO2 storage, which have been proven in individual
R&D project contexts but not on the scale and in the combination required for the industrial production of base chemicals and fuels.
The thermodynamic integration of the processes, their control and optimised operation under market conditions remains a tech-
nological challenge to be accepted and tackled by engineers and decision makers.
We assess the BIO scenario and the CYC scenario as having similar degrees of risk in terms of technological development. The BIO
scenario relies on the construction and successful operation of large-scale CCS plants and infrastructure, whereas the CYC scenario
depends to a great extent on cost reductions in electrolyser technologies through R&D and technological learning.16
Insufficient incentives for investment in new technologies
Putting aside whether or not technological developments will progress quickly enough, the scale of the necessary investment in
the scenarios poses an additional implementation risk. Companies might lack sufficient incentives to invest in cleaner technologies.
Given that markets such as those for basic chemicals tend to be highly competitive, any clean investment frontrunners will have
difficulties recovering their investment if they are unable to pass the higher costs of low-carbon production onto consumers. This is a
particular concern as under current framework conditions the specific production costs of most of the low-carbon technologies
available or emerging for the use in energy-intensive industries are expected to remain higher compared to conventional technologies
(Wesseling et al., 2017; Dechema, 2017). As in the case of the previous risk, this risk is most relevant for the two deep decarbonisation
scenarios, given their generally higher need for investment into new and typically more expensive technologies.
Delay in, or lack of, infrastructure investment
The three mitigation scenarios require the development of new infrastructure. Especially the BIO and CYC scenarios need high
investment into infrastructure for the distribution of heat in the port area. The BIO and TP scenarios assume pipelines for the
transport and sequestration of CO2. Especially the CYC scenario uses large quantities of renewables-based electricity, whereas the BIO
and the CYC scenarios rely on significant amounts of hydrogen.
We assess the infrastructure-related risks to be higher in the BIO scenario than in the CYC scenario, as the CCS infrastructure
required in the BIO scenario is likely to be more expensive and more complicated to implement than the additional17 electricity or
hydrogen infrastructure required in the CYC scenario. The heat grid is mainly limited to the port area and the associated risks, such as
a lack of willingness by local companies to participate in the exchange of heat, are, therefore, internal to the cluster. Conversely, CO2
transport and sequestration infrastructure, as well as an expansion of the electricity or hydrogen grid, require at least in part external
cooperation or certain external developments, making public involvement in terms of planning, acceptance and funding crucial.
Opposition from status-quo interests
Existing industrial businesses in the port are long-established and are mainly owned by large international companies such as
Shell, Engie and E.ON. In the decarbonisation scenarios, many of these businesses’ assets will either not be renewed over time or will
even be devalued, potentially affecting their owners' balance sheets as well as the interests of the work force. Consequently, there
might be strong incentives for status-quo interests to oppose any scenarios other than BAU. This holds particularly true for refineries
16 IEA’s “Technology Roadmap Hydrogen and Fuel Cells” (IEA, 2015b) foresees massive potential capital cost reductions, e.g. from 2,600 US-$/kW
in 2015 to 800 US-$/kW in 2030 and even 640 US-$/kW in 2050 for polymer electrolyte membrane (PEM) electrolysers. With regard to the
calculated capacity need of 5.7 GW in the CYC scenario, this would still imply an investment of 3.6 billion US-$ by 2050. Schmidt et al. (2017)
derive similar results on potential investment cost reductions from an expert panel and also analyse technical lifetime and energy efficiency
potentials as two important factors contributing to operational costs. They identify capacity scale-up as the major driver for future total cost
reduction, more relevant than R&D funding.
17 The word “additional” refers to the fact that in the BIO scenario the electricity transmission and distribution infrastructure will already need to
be expanded and/or amended compared to today, although probably to a lesser degree than in the CYC scenario, as the scenarios’ electricity
balances (see Fig. 4) indicate.
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and conventional electricity generation companies, as these industries quickly lose relevance especially in the non−CCS scenario
CYC.18 The chemical industry might also oppose decarbonisation efforts, not because decarbonisation would cause their business to
cease, but because of the inherent technological, economic and organisational challenges of converting their production assets.
Lack of public acceptance for the use of new technologies
CCS technology has been intensively debated and is facing public opposition in the Netherlands (van Egmond and Hekkert, 2015;
Brunsting et al., 2011). Potential difficulties in implementing CCS technology pose a threat to all scenarios except the CYC scenario.
Certain industrial technologies may also face a lack of public acceptance in the future. Particularly waste pyrolysis, which would
require waste shipments to Rotterdam, as well as new pipelines for hydrogen or other chemicals might be affected. Also, the sus-
tainability of large-scale biomass imports from overseas for energy or feedstock is a matter of public debate in the Netherlands and
other countries (van Hilst et al., 2017) and could eventually lead to a lack of public acceptance for such a strategy, which would be
particularly problematic for the BIO scenario.19
Lack of public acceptance for the use of existing technologies
The debate about coal-fired electricity generation has been gaining momentum in recent years, particularly in the Netherlands
where NGOs and some political parties have long been calling for a phase-out of coal-fired power plants. Consequently, the BAU and
to a lesser extent the TP scenarios could be affected by reduced public acceptance for the unsustainable business models locking the
cluster into high carbon pathways. With a likely future increase in the visibility of climate change-related environmental damage, this
could become a significant risk making the BAU pathway unsustainable by 2050. Recent stringent political decisions in the
Netherlands about coal-fired power plants – affecting also recently-built plants – are a clear indication that this business risk is
relevant (Meijer, 2018). The risk could also become relevant in the future for the refineries and chemical plants, at least if a BAU
pathway is followed.
Lack of sufficient access to, or excessive future prices of, green energy or CO2 emission allowances
All scenarios need significant external resources to mainly replace the fossil intake of oil and coal in the metabolism of the
industrial cluster.
• Biomass is currently the most competitive clean energy carrier but increasing demand could push prices up. Furthermore, there
are strong doubts about whether substantial biomass resources are really available with low life-cycle GHG emissions. This creates
the significant risk that sustainable biomass supply will be severely restricted in the future, leading to higher biomass prices and
potentially compromising the viability of the BIO scenario.
• Large amounts of renewables-based electricity will be needed in the CYC scenario in particular. Its availability depends on a strong
future expansion of renewables-based electricity generation in the Netherlands and the rest of Europe, as well as on related
changes in the electricity transport and storage infrastructure. While the costs for electricity from renewable sources such as wind
and solar PV have significantly reduced in recent years (Samadi, 2018; IRENA, 2018), the expansion and system integration of
renewables – particularly for the CYC scenario – would have to happen quickly and it is unclear whether this is achievable.20
• The main risk regarding the use of hydrogen and/or synthetic fuels, which are mainly used in the BIO and CYC scenarios, is that
the global development of renewables-based hydrogen or synthetic fuels will not occur at sufficient speed or scale. Consequently,
the cost of these energy carriers would remain too high. Infrastructure issues, in contrast, do not seem to pose a relevant risk here.
Synthetic fuels in particular could make use of the obsolete capacities of mineral oil-based energy infrastructures.
• Particularly in the BAU scenario the availability of CO2 emission allowances at reasonable cost for the operation in the industrial
cluster could become an issue, given the already-determined reduction factors in the EU-ETS and the European GHG emission
reduction targets for 2050.
4.1.2. Discussion of consequential risks
Economic structure might not remain sustainable post-2050
The economic structure of the port’s industrial cluster might not remain economically viable after 2050. This is especially true for
the BAU scenario. Even if such a scenario is viable until 2050 as a result of weak European climate mitigation efforts, it is possible
that mitigation efforts will intensify in the second half of the century, finally endangering the business case of the cluster. In some
sense the risk of a cluster becoming economically unsustainable is a standard risk for any industrial cluster, but in times of climate
18 Unlike in the CYC scenario, the existing coal power plants continue to be utilised beyond 2050 in the BIO scenario, although with a change in
fuel. Long-term refinery capacity in the BIO scenario is also slightly higher than in the CYC scenario.
19 It should be noted that strategies exist to increase public acceptance for the use of new technologies (Frewer, 1999; Terwel et al., 2011). The
appropriate use of such strategies can considerably reduce the risk of technologies failing to be deployed due to public opposition.
20 Hydrogen and/or synthetic fuels could, to some extent, provide an alternative to the direct use of electricity. These energy sources could be
produced elsewhere in the world and then shipped to Rotterdam as energy input. The potentially global supply significantly reduces risks. The
production of both energy carriers, however, incurs significant conversion costs on top of the costs of the renewables-based electricity required. (See
also the following discussion of the risks associated with hydrogen and synthetic fuels.)
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change it is certainly higher for emission-intensive clusters and for production sites with large, inherently inflexible production assets.
This is the case in both the BAU scenario and – to a lesser extent – in the TP scenario, with the key role of big refineries, crackers and
coal-fired power plants. In the BIO scenario, uncertainty regarding the availability of sustainably-sourced biomass at acceptable cost
in the post-2050 period poses a risk because global production might increasingly seek to shift to biomass, asserting pressure on costs
and availability.
Industrial activities could be affected by climate change impacts
Rotterdam is a coastal region and is, therefore, particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts such as rising sea levels, flooding
due to periods of heavy rainfall, storms etc. It seems plausible that under the BAU scenario, increased global warming and associated
climate impacts would occur more readily compared to the mitigation scenarios.
4.2. Discussion of opportunities
Scenarios are not only associated with risks, but also with opportunities. As for risks, opportunities differ from one scenario to
another and this is shown in Table 2. The greatest opportunities are associated with the most ambitious decarbonisation scenarios,
particularly for the CYC scenario.
Contributing substantially to global climate change mitigation efforts
The decarbonisation scenarios make a significant contribution to national and European climate mitigation targets. Particularly
the BIO and CYC scenarios reduce the emissions of one of the major GHG-emitting regions of the Netherlands to practically zero by
2050. By helping to develop key mitigation technologies for the industrial sector and by successfully showcasing their im-
plementation, the chance of similar technologies and strategies being used in other industrial clusters around the world increases. By
becoming a frontrunner in industrial decarbonisation, the port may serve as an important example for other petrochemical clusters in
Europe, such as Antwerp in Belgium, the Rhine-Ruhr area and Ludwigshafen in Germany, Stenungsund in Sweden or Tarragona in
Spain, or even beyond Europe. The port could demonstrate that it is possible for such regions to embark on a pathway that ultimately
aims to completely avoid net CO2 emissions. In the TP scenario, these benefits only partly apply, as it is less ambitious regarding
climate protection and implies less use of key new deep decarbonisation technologies. No such benefits exist in the BAU scenario.
Benefitting from being a frontrunner in industrial decarbonisation
Early and meaningful decarbonisation efforts offer the possibility of becoming a frontrunner in industrial decarbonisation. This, in
turn, should make it more likely for the region to receive grants for early demonstration projects and to attract new, low-carbon
industrial activities and related innovations. As part of the study conducted for the Port of Rotterdam (Samadi et al., 2016), we
identified the following new products and new industrial activities – each with high potential relevance in a future decarbonised




• CO2 transport and storage
• Use of waste
• Synthetic fuels
• Carbon-neutral primary steel production
If the deep decarbonisation pathways are successfully pursued, the Port of Rotterdam may internationally become known as the
Table 2
Opportunities identified for the four scenarios developed.
Opportunities BAU TP BIO CYC
Contributing substantially to global climate change mitigation efforts X XX XX
Benefitting from being a frontrunner in industrial decarbonisation X XX XX
Gaining a competitive edge in an increasingly decarbonised future world X XX
Improving air quality X XX
21 As large electricity consumers, the port's industries have significant potential to adapt their electricity demand to supply. The port’s industries
could benefit from becoming major providers of electricity demand flexibility. New types of electricity demand foreseen mainly in the chemical
sector (and especially in the CYC scenario), such as electrolysis and electric steam generation, are generally suitable for flexible operation, with
higher demand at times of low electricity prices and lower demand at times of high prices. Steam generation in particular is generally well-suited to
flexible operation due to (typically) relatively low investment costs and the possibility of taking advantage of the storage capacities of existing heat
and steam grids.
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world’s leading “Port of Decarbonisation”. We are not aware of similarly far-reaching deep decarbonisation discussions and plans for
other industrial regions in the world, although projects and initiatives exist or are currently being conducted that discuss the potential
for achieving significant emission reductions in other industrial regions in Europe (e.g. TNO, 2018; MWIDE, 2018) and in other
countries (e.g. Liu et al., 2018). Obviously, efforts to decarbonise the port’s inbound, outbound and internal transport also need to be
part of a holistic decarbonisation strategy and could possibly support global transport sector decarbonisation efforts.22
Gaining a competitive edge in an increasingly decarbonised future world
Early steps towards decarbonisation may offer potential for the region to obtain a competitive edge over other regions and similar
industrial locations, thus ensuring continued economic relevance and prosperity for the Rotterdam area. The potential for gaining a
competitive edge is further aided by opportunities for the port’s industrial cluster to take advantage of its unique geographical
location. The cluster, for example, is in close proximity to potential CO2 storage sites in the North Sea as well as to North Sea areas
that are well suited to offshore wind power generation. The port also provides the possibility of importing low-carbon energy carriers
in the form of biomass and/or renewables-based synthetic fuels at relatively low transport costs.
Improving air quality
Significant reductions in the use of fossil fuel energy sources in power generation and industry will provide a considerable co-
benefit to the region in the form of air quality improvements. Progressively switching from fossil fuels to electricity and hydrogen in
industrial end-use will eventually virtually eliminate industries’ local air pollution in the CYC scenario. The improvements are less
pronounced in the BIO scenario with its heavy use of biomass for electricity generation and fuel production for gasification and
Fischer-Tropsch, each being associated with local pollution of its own.23
4.3. Taking steps to mitigate the scenario-related risks
Table 3 shows the four risks identified in Section 4.1 that are likely to be the most relevant for the ambitious CYC scenario. The
table also indicates how each of these risks might be mitigated and who the relevant stakeholders are. Our analysis indicates that
most of the risks could be significantly mitigated by appropriate policies pursued by the EU and the Dutch national government.
Appropriate policies include stringent CO2 pricing through emission trading and/or a carbon tax, offering long-term certainty to
investors, active RD&D support, investment support for key new low-carbon technologies and infrastructure, and trade and market
policies to enable bulk products like decarbonised and/or renewables-based basic chemicals to be competitive in their respective
markets.
Mitigating the risks associated with deep decarbonisation pathways does not seem to face general conceptual problems, as a broad
suite of policy instruments already exist as known enablers of GHG emissions mitigation (Åhman et al., 2017; Bataille et al., 2018).
However, the risk management of ambitious decarbonisation strategies for an industrial cluster requires a strong package of such
climate policy instruments, together with appropriate industrial policy strategies (Nilsson et al., 2017). In this regard, the EU and
national governments appear to be the key actors with the tools to motivate and enable industrial stakeholders to take action towards
ambitious strategies.
It can be argued, of course, that it is too simple to merely call on national governments and the EU to enact appropriately strong
policy packages, as such sweeping policy changes are only likely to happen when there is sufficient pressure from within society to
embark on such pathways. It follows, therefore, that the public needs to be informed about the possibilities and advantages associated
with deep decarbonisation pathways for industrial clusters. Participatory analyses, such as the one presented in this article, serve to
provide insights to help inform both policymakers and the general public. In order to ensure long-term acceptance and buy-in from
the public, it is critically important to use such approaches to secure early public engagement when devising and implementing
transformation processes.
5. Conclusion
This paper explains how a combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods can be used to develop a range of
plausible pathways for industrial clusters to achieve CO2 emission reductions by the middle of the century in line with the still
uncertain future global or regional climate mitigation ambitions – and thereby significantly reduce the risks associated with the
current CO2-intensive business model. The insights gained from this analysis can inform individual companies and regional autho-
rities such as the Port of Rotterdam Authority on the range of conceivable future developments of the cluster, including the respective
technological and infrastructural changes. The insights can also inform policymakers, especially by highlighting how an appropriate
policy framework can address the key implementation risks related to decarbonisation scenarios.
The analysis of risks associated with each scenario found that a key risk of any pathway aiming for deep decarbonisation by 2050
is if the mitigation ambition as expressed in the Paris Agreement fails to be underpinned by appropriate and continuous energy,
climate and industrial policy measures. This could render early investment into clean technology uncompetitive, even in the long
22 Long-term options to decarbonise the port’s inbound and outbound transport activities have also recently been proposed by a report com-
missioned by the Port Authority (see Lechtenböhmer et al., 2018).
23 The exact air pollution outcomes of the scenarios depend heavily on specific future technological configurations. Our modelling approach is not
sufficiently detailed to provide a quantitative assessment of scenario differences in air pollution.
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term. On the other hand, the key risk of BAU or insufficient mitigation is that carbon-intensive production continues to be locked in.
This would lead to high production costs and diminishing demand for transport fuels and other products if the “rest of the world”
sooner or later decides to follow through with ambitious climate protection.24
Our analysis of scenario risks also suggests that the two highly ambitious deep decarbonisation scenarios differ considerably in
terms of some of the identified implementation risks. The biomass and CCS-focused BIO scenario is associated with higher im-
plementation risks linked to infrastructure expansion, public acceptance and biomass availability, although the circular economy
scenario CYC might be opposed more strongly by status-quo interests and depends to a greater extent on the sufficient availability of
carbon-free electricity from outside the cluster. In the BIO scenario, the liquid fuel supply chain is strengthened by establishing a
chain at the port ranging from the conversion of crude biomass to final products (i.e. fuels), whereas in the CYC scenario the
petrochemical sector is converted to a system, which could be more robust to post-2050 developments. In order to hedge some of the
risks, strategies from both scenarios may be, to some extent, combined. This would mean to strengthen the bio-fuel chain while at the
same time adapting the petrochemical sector to a circular economy. Such a combination could open up synergies but would also
increase strategy-related risks.
It is an urgent task for policymakers and for underlying advocacy from within society to ensure the policy framework takes a form
that makes the risks associated with deep decarbonisation scenarios lower than the risks associated with insufficient mitigation
action. It is likely that such a policy framework would need to include more active public roles in enabling forward-looking in-
vestment in clean technologies, in providing the required infrastructure and in enabling green production to compete with dirtier
production at lower market cost. In other words, a strong, coherent and targeted industrial and climate policy framework will be
required.
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